Introduction
The politics and economics of eastern Mediterranean energy are rapidly changing. The political transition in Egypt after the Arab Spring, the civil war in Syria, the emergence of Turkey as leading regional power, the tensions between Israel and Gaza, the repeated strains between Turkey and Israel and the never-ending dispute between Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus are -all together-reshuffling the regional geopolitical equilibrium.
At the same time natural gas findings are flourishing in the offshore of Egypt, Israel, and Cyprus, reshaping the regional energy map and rapidly making the eastern Mediterranean a world-class natural gas province.
These geopolitical and energy pressures are rapidly converging, generating a number of new challenges and opportunities for each player in the region. The aim of this paper is to provide a wide framework of understanding of this situation, through the lens of natural gas geopolitics.
To this end, the paper will first provide an overview on the eastern Mediterranean natural gas market, also illustrating the most important project of natural gas cooperation ever attempted in the region: the Arab Gas Network. Secondly, the paper will describe how the recent unilateral halt of Egyptian gas supplies to Israel and the interruption of the Arab Gas Pipeline in the aftermath of the Arab Spring ended the expectations of regional gas cooperation embodied by the Arab Gas Network project.
The Arab Spring has transformed the geopolitical architecture of the region, making extremely difficult any form of comprehensive regional cooperation in the natural gas market, which now appears to be entering a new phase of anarchy. Furthermore, a second element has come to make obsolete the cooperation scheme designed with the Arab Gas Network: the unprecedented wave of natural gas discoveries in the offshore eastern Mediterranean.
For this reason, the paper will widely discuss these new developments, which could reshuffle the old regional natural gas cooperation scheme, shifting influence away from the regional gas exporter to new gas producing countries. A power shift that has the potential to generate new energy and political alliances in a region in transition, and that could finally represent the cornerstone of a new potential Eastern Mediterranean Energy Corridor.
The eastern Mediterranean gas market: from the Arab Gas Network to anarchy?
Over the last decades natural gas consumption has soared in eastern Mediterranean countries. According to OME (2011), in 1990 the regional share of natural gas in the primary energy mix was only 5%, while in 2009 it was 27%
1 . This trend is expected to further increase over the next years, as all countries in the region will increase their energy consumption because of rapid population growth, urbanization and economic growth.
All eastern Mediterranean countries are net gas-importers, with the only exception of Egypt: the regional gas-exporter. This is the reason why Egypt used to represent a cornerstone in the emergent regional gas market as well as the core of the most ambitious energy cooperation project ever attempted in the eastern Mediterranean region: the Arab Gas Network.
Egypt's proven gas reserves were estimated at 2200 bcm in 2011 2 , representing the third-largest reserves in Africa after Nigeria and Algeria. Egypt's natural gas sector has expanded rapidly over the last decades, with production quadrupling between 1998 and 2011 3 . In the aftermath of the Arab Spring and with the new government led by the Muslim Brotherhood's Mohammed Mursi, Egypt has entered a new phase also with regard to the natural gas sector. In fact, also if gas production hasn't been directly hit by Egypt's 17 months of political unrest, the attendant decision-making vacuum in government ministries has effectively blocked the inflow of needed upstream investment 4 .
Already a net oil importer, in the short term Egypt could thus become a gas importer if it cannot find a way to boost its production to meet its growing domestic demand (+8% per year 5 ) and its export commitments. Egyptian officials visited Qatar and Algeria in September 2012 to discuss potential LNG imports 6 . The Egyptian Natural Gas Holding (EGAS) is now asking local and foreign companies to import LNG, establish a regasification terminal and market imported gas to local consumers. EGAS is likely to give priority to proposals with the earliest first delivery date, starting in May 2013 7 .
Egyptian private equity firm Citadel Capital and QInvest -a Qatari investment bank linked to the Qatar Investment Authority, the country's Sovereign Wealth Fund-have jointly worked on plans to install a floating storage and regasification unit (FRSU) Egypt's international gas transport infrastructure system is composed by two LNG plants -located in Damietta and Idku-and two pipelines -the El Arish-Ashkelon Pipeline and the Arab Gas Pipeline-.
The Damietta LNG complex is located 60 km west of Port Said and has one train with a total capacity of 4.8 Mt/year of LNG. It is owned and operated by SEGAS, a SpanishEgyptian gas company composed by Union Fenosa Gas (80%), EGAS (10%) and EGPC (10%). The Idku LNG complex is located 50 km east of Alexandria and has two trains with a total capacity of 7.2 Mt/year. The structure was designed to accommodate up to six trains in total, so there is space for expansion. The complex is owned by Egyptian LNG, a joint venture comprising local shareholders (such as the Egyptian General Petroleum Company and EGAS) and foreign shareholders (such as British Gas, Petronas and Gaz de France) 11 .
Notwithstanding the crucial importance of these facilities for Egypt's natural gas export, in terms of regional energy cooperation the country's key infrastructure elements are the two international pipelines previously mentioned: the El Arish-Ashkelon Pipeline and the Arab Gas Pipeline. Egypt's natural gas export infrastructure Source: OME (2011)
The El Arish-Ashkelon Pipeline is a 90 km submarine gas pipeline connecting Egypt with Israel. The pipeline is built, owned and operated by the East Mediterranean Gas Company (EMG). Operational since 2008, EMG buys Egyptian gas for resale in Israel. In 2010 the pipeline supplied approximately half of the natural gas consumed in Israel 12 .
The total physical capacity of the pipeline is 9 bcm/year and agreements between the two nations used to provide a framework for the purchase of up to 7.5 bcm/year of Egyptian gas by Israeli entities, making Israel one of Egypt's most important natural gas export markets 13 .
In 2010 some Egyptian activists appealed for a legal provision against governmental authorities to stop gas flow to Israel according to the obscure contract and very low price compared to the global rates, whatever it means. However, the provision was 12 Initially Egypt and Israel had agreed to supply through this pipeline 1.7 bcm of natural gas per year for use by the Israel Electric Corporation (IEC). This has been raised to 2.1 bcm per year to be delivered through the year 2028. In addition, by late 2009, EMG had signed contracts to supply through the pipeline additional 2 bcm per year to private electricity generators and various industrial. 13 Upstream (2008) , "Egyptian gas flows to Israel", March 10. Britain, Germany, Canada, and Russia. 17 Prior to the downfall of the Mubarak regime in January 2011, Jordan's electricity generation was 80% fuelled by Egyptian gas, sold at concessionary prices. But since then Egyptian gas exports to Jordan were severely disrupted because of the frequent acts of sabotage to the Arab Gas Pipeline. This forced Jordan to switch to the more expensive fuel oil or diesel to generate electricity, and at the same time to import more crude from mainly Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser extent from Iraq to offset the loss of Egyptian gas. 18 Globes (2011) , "Sixth Attack on Sinai Gas Pipeline", September 27. 19 Turkey expected to buy about 2 bcm/year of gas from the Arab Gas Pipeline.
This project of cooperation was supported by the European Union, which also launched in 2005 the "Euro-Arab Mashreq Gas Market Project". The project was aimed at contributing to the integration of the gas markets of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria in order to create a regional gas market in the Mashreq, as a first step towards integration with the EU gas market. The project focused on developing a Gas Master Plan and network development for the region, as well as on putting the necessary regulatory frameworks in place. After a first phase (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) where Iraq and Turkey participated as observers, the project has been extended for a second phase (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) , with Iraq as a full partner 20 . However, this cooperation effort has presently been completely nullified by the Arab Spring.
Summarizing, the recent unilateral halt of Egyptian gas supplies to Israel through the El Arish-Ashkelon Pipeline and the recent halt of the Arab Gas Pipeline due to several attacks on the infrastructure in the aftermath of the Egyptian revolution, ended the expectations of natural gas cooperation embodied by the Arab Gas Network project. The political turmoil in Egypt, the civil war in Syria and the new conflictual relations between Egypt and Israel have undermined the existing geopolitical equilibrium of the region, making for the time being extremely difficult any form of comprehensive regional cooperation in the natural gas market. Furthermore, a second element has come to make obsolete the cooperation scheme designed with the Arab Gas Network: the unprecedented wave of natural gas discoveries in the offshore eastern Mediterranean. A game-changer that can reshuffle the old regional natural gas cooperation scheme, shifting influence partially away from the traditional regional gas exporter to new gas producers. Exploration activity in the offshore eastern Mediterranean experienced a significant renaissance since 1999-2000 when five modest natural gas fields were discovered at a shallow depth west of the coastal town of Ashqelon and the Gaza Strip 23 . These discoveries speeded up exploration efforts and promoted the acquisition of geophysical data throughout the entire eastern Mediterranean area, particularly in the Levant basin.
Mapping the new natural gas discoveries in offshore eastern Mediterranean
The real turning point in terms of natural gas discoveries came in 2009, when Noble Energy announced the discovery of the Tamar field (250 bcm) in offshore Israel. After this first major discovery, Noble Energy announced other two major finding in the Levant Basin: the Leviathan field (476 bcm) in offshore Israel (2010) and the Aphrodite field (140-220 bcm) in offshore Cyprus (2011). Moreover, other natural gas reserves are likely to be discovered in offshore Lebanon and Gaza. Province. An estimated 6310 bcm (mean estimate) of undiscovered, technically recoverable natural gas would be located in the Basin 25 . This assessment was based on published geologic information and on commercial data from oil and gas wells, fields, and field production.
In the aftermath of the political turmoil that reversed the regime of Hosni Mubarak with the new elected-government of Mohamed Morsi, key operators such as British Petroleum (BP), BG Group, Shell and Eni have been promoting their commitments to Egypt via multi-billion investment plans. The commitments come after new Oil Minister Usama Kamal called on the country's key foreign operators "to develop and increase their investment and accelerate development of gas discoveries, especially in the deepwater offshore Mediterranean" 26 . BP promised an investment of $11bn on the offshore West Nile Delta project. BG pledged an investment of $3-5bn in the country over the coming years. Shell and Eni also publicized their commitment to Egypt via multi-billion investment plans. In part these commintments are already being undertaken, as Eni, BP and BG are already increasing gas production in offshore Egypt.
Eni and BP have started the production of natural gas from the offshore field of Seth, located in the Ras El Barr concession 27 , approximately 60 km from the Mediterranean coast of Egypt. After an initial ramp-up phase, the field is expected to produce approximately 4.8 million cubic meters of gas per day. The Seth project, whose construction and operations has been assigned by Eni and BP to Petrobel, a joint venture between IEOC and the Egyptian state company EGPC, consists of a platform placed at a water depth of 80 meters, two production wells and a pipeline of 11 km. A pipeline links the platform to the onshore processing facility in El Gamil, which handles around 20% of the natural gas produced in Egypt, through the existing transport network 28 . BP has also announced in August 2012 two gas discoveries in offshore Egypt's Nile Delta 29 .
The two finds - Taurt 
Gas concessions in the Mediterranean Nile Delta and North Sinai
Source: OME (2011) on EGAS Looking further ahead, gas-focused licensing rounds both this year and next, and the promise of more flexible gas-pricing terms for would-be bidders, should give impetus to the development of new fields. The danger remains that ongoing political uncertainties and bureaucratic inertia slow progress on these fronts. EGAS is expected to launch a round offering offshore blocks before the end of 2013. However, required parliamentary approval before final agreements can be signed, could lead to delays in awarding blocks to bidding companies 32 .
Israel
Israel has traditionally relied on imports to meet its energy demand. However, with the discovery of the Mari-B gas field occurred in 2000 33 , Israel suddenly had a domestic supply natural gas. After this discovery, Noble Energy and Delek continued to pursue gas exploration in offshore Israel, discovering two massive offshore natural gas reservoirs: Tamar and Leviathan. These two finds are the biggest deep-water gas discoveries ever occurred in the eastern Mediterranean region, and could help Israel not When fully operational, it is expected to produce about 10 bcm/year of gas. This gas will be devoted to satisfy Israel's growing domestic gas demand, a very urgent concern for the country. In fact, natural gas consumption in Israel has grown from zero in 2000 to 5.3 bcm in 2010 36 , of which 40% had been supplied by Egypt via the El-ArishAshkelon Pipeline. After the already mentioned halt of Egyptian gas supplies to Israel occurred in 2011, the country is due to begin receiving LNG equivalent to 2.5 bcm/y of gas through a floating regasification and storage unit (FRSU). The LNG will help Israel cope with a gas shortage created by the halt of Egyptian gas deliveries, until the gas production in the Tamar field will begin.
The offshore Leviathan field (476 bcm) was discovered in December 2010, 135 km off the northern coast of Israel. Since Tamar can fulfill a significant part of Israel's gas requirements for the foreseeable future, the Leviathan output will likely be directed In the long-term scenario the development of the Gaza Marine gas fields could represent a win-win solution for Israel and the Palestinian Authority. First of all, it could be clearly very much beneficial for the Palestinian natural gas demand outlook, which is projected to expand from the current level of 0.3 bcm/y to almost 1 bcm/y over the course of the next decade as the Palestinian power sector is developed. The Gaza Marine gas fields could supply the Gaza power station (140 MW) and the two planned power stations in the West Bank (both in Jenin, 200 MW each).
Moreover, revenues earned through the sale of Gaza Marine gas could help to ease recent financial problems faced by the Palestinian Authority 45 due to a lack of international aid, significantly contributing to the Palestinian fiscal sustainability. In addition, the development of the Gaza Marine gas fields could also be economically beneficial for Israel, considering that today the Gaza Strip and the West Bank receive almost all of their electricity from Israel at an extremely poor payment regime 46 .
Cyprus
In 2011 Noble Energy discovered in offshore Cyprus (Block 12) a natural gas reservoir with a resource estimated at 140-220 bcm: the Aphrodite field 47 . According to the Cyprus' Energy Department, the country's offshore may contain as much as 1700 bcm 41 The Daily Star (2010) designing a development plan for the Aphrodite field, which will likely first address the island's domestic gas demand for power generation and later be used to supply gas to a LNG export plant.
The Aphrodite field lies in waters that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus also claims. This position is backed by Turkey, which claims that the Greek-Cypriot government in the south does not have the authority to make decisions concerning the island's natural resources and insists that exploration work stop until a settlement to the decades-old 'Cyprus Problem' be found.
Cyprus's offshore exploration blocks

Source: MEES
In response to the offshore drilling program being carried out by the Republic of Cyprus in its offshore exclusive economic zone, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has commissioned to Turkish Petroleum (TPAO) the exploration of offshore areas in northern Cyprus. For these reasons, gas exploration in the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus is highly politically charged. In fact, Turkey has also threatened to blacklist firms taking part on this development. However, several majors seem to be ready to risk their relations with Turkey in favor of offshore exploration for natural gas in the offshore Republic of Cyprus 49 .
Eni signed in January 2013 Exploration and Production Sharing Contracts with the Republic of Cyprus for Blocks 2, 3 and 9, thus marking the entry of Eni in the country. Cyprus' decision to include Eni in the country's gas exploration and production activity is in line with its intention to strengthen its economic connection with other EU member states.
The awards have been made despite Turkey's objections to the licensing round. In fact, Turkey threatened to exclude any company that participated from future energy projects within Turkey. However, it seems that there is not much Turkey can do to prevent exploration in the waters of the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey seems to be isolated on this issue, as the EU, the US and Arab states in the region do not support its position. Cyprus has been careful to build up political support from its neighbors and has agreed maritime boundary delineations with Israel, Egypt and Lebanon. Also given the breakdown in previously close relations between Turkey and Israel over a range of issues including the Gaza flotilla raid in May 2010, when Turkish peace activists were killed, both Greece and Cyprus have developed closer ties in the meantime with Israel at the expense of Turkey.
Lebanon
Lebanon has never experienced a hydrocarbon exploration activity on its territory 51 .
However, considering that the country's offshore geology is a continuation of that offshore Israel, after the massive natural gas findings in this area a detailed 3D seismic survey of Lebanon's offshore has been undertaken 52 . The survey, carried out by the UKbased Spectrum ASA in the "Phase 1" area offshore Lebanon, was completed in September 2012. This survey estimates Lebanon's natural gas reserves at 700 bcm 53 , a level even higher than Cyprus's offshore potential. A new offshore 3D seismic project is currently underway in the "Phase 2" offshore area. 
Lebanon's offshore seismic acquisition
Source: MEES on Spectrum
The development of Lebanon's natural gas sector mainly depends on the country's capability to move forward with its long-stalled offshore bid licensing round. A launch was planned in early 2013, despite ongoing negotiations between Israel, Lebanon and the United Nations over a disputed maritime border between Israel and Lebanon 54 . The round's launch was said to mainly depend on the finalization of the country's Petroleum Administration, the government body that is to administrate Lebanon's hydrocarbon sector under the supervision of the Ministry of Energy and Water 55 .
The establishment of this institution took time, as the new government body had to be made up of members representing each of Lebanon's religious communities. In fact, Lebanon is a parliamentary democratic republic within the overall framework of confessionalism, a form of consociativism in which the highest offices are proportionately reserved for representatives of the country's numerous religious communities 56 . Lebanon has finally named the long-awaited Petroleum Administration To conclude, the political stability of the country will be crucially important for the development of the natural gas resources. With this regard, an exogenous element should be always taken into consideration: the on-going civil war in Syria. The final outcome of this turmoil is currently unpredictable and -among the different scenarios-it is necessary to also consider an eventual spread of the conflict to other neighbouring countries and in particular to the north of Lebanon. Such a scenario would clearly halt any natural gas development in the area for an undefined period of time.
Greece
In 2010 Greece's Energy Ministry commissioned a group of experts to research potential natural gas reserves in Greek waters. The study, recently presented to Greece's Prime Minister Antonis Samaras, outlined a number of geological similarities between the area offshore Crete and the natural gas-rich area encompassed between offshore Israel and Cyprus 60 and estimates the potential natural gas reserves in offshore Greece at 3.5 Tcm. While it will take years to explore and develop any offshore natural gas sector, Greece has launched a licensing round and has commissioned Norway-based Petroleum Geo-Services (PGS) to carry out offshore seismic tests in the area 61 . The results are expected in mid-2013. Such a development would be extremely significant for the country, under several aspects. Taking into account savings from fuel imports -Greece spends 5% of GDP on energy imports -discoveries on the scale envisaged could provide the country with an important amount of annual cost savings, in a moment on which this is very much needed. Furthermore, Greece could also become a transit hub for natural gas to Europe if it establishes an exclusive economic zone allowing it to legally extract hydrocarbons, which it currently lacks south of Crete and in other areas. The consortium supporting the ITGI pipeline project, which lost out in the race to carry president and will head up the Quality, Health, Safety and Environment functions of the committee. Nasser will direct the Strategic Planning Unit while Technical and Engineering Affairs will come under Hoteit. Daaboul is head of the Legal Affairs Unit and al-Zahabi is in charge of Economic and Financial Affairs. The Geology and Geophysics Unit will be run by Chbat. 58 The round was also supposed to have been launched early this year but political wrangling over the composition of the Petroleum Authority held up the process. 59 LNG Intelligence (2012); "Lebanon's Offshore", November 12. 60 The study affirms that there is an indication of the presence of large reservoirs based on the subsea methane emissions and gas hydrate mounds on the seabed. 61 Reuters (2012) , "Greece picks PGS for offshore oil, gas tests", September 5.
Caspian supplies to Europe 62 , hopes to convert his project into a conduit linking eastern
Mediterranean discoveries with the European market 63 .
A new Israel-Cyprus-Greece axis? Energy and geopolitical aspects
Once described the vast natural gas reserves in the offshore eastern Mediterranean, it is necessary to understand if and how this gas could flow to the most likely export market in the region: Europe. As always in the natural gas market it is this step -the infrastructure-that opens the real geopolitical "Great Game".
In November 2012 Israel, Cyprus and Greece signed an agreement to set up working groups to discuss an Eastern Mediterranean Energy Corridor meant to enable gas exports from Israel and Cyprus to Greece 64 . There are three main options on the table, none of them front runners yet: (i) the joint Israel-Cyprus LNG plant at Vassilikos; (ii) the LNG plant in onshore Israel; (iii) the East Med Pipeline, which could carry Cypriot and Israeli gas to Europe. Another opportunity on the table is the construction of the EuroAsia Electricity Interconnector from Israel and Cyprus to Greece.
The Eastern Mediterranean Energy Corridor: infrastructure projects
Source: own elaboration
Israel-Cyprus joint LNG export plant at Vassilikos
The project of a joint Israeli-Cypriot LNG facility at Vassilikos, in Cyprus' southern coast, involves bringing gas from Israeli and Cypriot offshore gas fields to a liquefaction plant, and then exporting it by ship to Greece for regasification. This LNG facility -Vassilikos LNG facility in Israel East Med Gas Pipeline EuroAsia Electricity Interconnector project -supported by the Cypriot government and Noble Energy-presents a series of strengths and weaknesses.
On one hand, a joint LNG plant at Vassilikos seems to make the most economic sense given the Leviathan field's proximity to the Aphrodite field, and to be the only realistic and viable way to deliver Israeli and Cypriot natural gas to the EU. There are several LNG regasification terminals in the Mediterranean that could serve as entry points to Europe. This would permit the Eastern Mediterranean LNG to be not restricted to any particular market.
Mediterranean regasification terminals
Source: MEES on European Rim Policy and Investment Council
Moreover, building a joint plant at Vassilikos would allow Israel to bypass opposition that has raised against domestic LNG export plans in the port cities of Ashdod, Ashkelon and Eilat. Furthermore, this option would allow Israel to benefit from preferential terms for importing into other EU countries as well as EU grants.
On the other hand, the size of the area in Vassilikos is only about 2 sq. km, so various industry sources have questioned whether the area has enough space for a modern-sized export plant of at least three trains of 5 million tons/yr of LNG each.
An even more relevant weakness of the project relates to Israeli concerns on the control of revenues earned from exports (control over what will be significant state revenues is vital for Israel) as well as potential security risks should Cyprus become embroiled in a situation of higher political tensions with Turkey 65 . From a military point of view, Israel's generals appear to have no doubts over the necessity of putting the export facility firmly within Israeli sovereignty 66 .
LNG export plant in Israel
Potential sites for an LNG export terminal in Israel include the Red Sea port of Eilat, and the Mediterranean ports of Ashkelon, Ashdod and Haifa. Plans for a new Israeli LNG export terminal are already attracting interest from international companies. Noble is currently evaluating offers received on September 2012 for a 30% stake in its operated Leviathan field, which would be the flagship field feeding any Israeli LNG scheme. However, a strong environmental and residential opposition against domestic LNG export plans has risen in the port cities of Ashdod, Ashkelon and Eilat over the last months.
Moreover, a number of technical problems exist as well. For instance, the first location to be proposed for an LNG facility had been the Red Sea port of Eilat, which could be connected to the Leviathan field via a new gas pipeline built parallel to an existing oil pipeline running along the Israeli coast from the port of Ashkelon. Considering that the Gulf of Aqaba measures only 24 km at its widest point, LNG tankers would have difficulty maneuvering in such a tight space. Any Eilat LNG plant would also have to share space with Israel's and neighboring Jordan's biggest tourist hubs, and with major container terminals in both countries.
The East Med Gas Pipeline
The East Med Gas Pipeline would link Israel and Cyprus to Greece and Italy. This option, which presents a number of technical and financial difficulties, could represents a good long term option only in the case further gas discoveries will emerge in the offshore eastern Mediterranean. Bearing in mind that -in the case gas discoveries in offshore Greece will actually materialize-a pipeline would anyhow have to be constructed from the Cretan gas fields to mainland Greece, the challenging part of this project would be the construction of the pipeline between Cyprus and Crete. An infrastructure with an approximate stretch of 675 km to be built at depths of about 800 to 2000 meters: a major technical challenge, but which can be overcome. 
The East Med Pipeline route
Source: Pytheas Limited
However, the main weakness of the East Med Pipeline project relates to finance. Pytheas estimates that the construction cost of a pipeline from Cyprus to Crete with a capacity of 28 bcm/year at depths of around 2000 meters is likely to be around US$ 25 million per km 67 . The estimated capital cost for the pipeline from Cyprus to Crete would thus be around US$ 20 billion. An amount that could be justified only in case further natural gas discoveries will materialize in the offshore eastern Mediterranean.
The EuroAsia Electricity Interconnector
The EuroAsia Electricity Interconnector is a proposed interconnector to link Greek, Cypriot and Israeli power grids via the world's longest submarine power cable.
The 287 km cable would link Israel with Cyprus. Cyprus will be connected with the Greek island of Crete. From Crete, an existing cable will be used for connection to mainland Greece providing a connection to the pan-European electricity grid. If built, the total length of the interconnector will be about 1000 km and it would be laid depths of up to 2000 metres under sea level. It will have a capacity to transmit 2000 MW of electricity in either direction. It is expected to cost €1.5 billion, of which €500 million is the cost of the Israel-Cyprus link 68 . the Israeli Electric Corporation. If the final investment decision will be positive, the project could be launched in 2013. The project is expected to be completed within 3 years from the beginning of construction 69 .
Geopolitical implications of a new Israel-Cyprus-Greece energy axis
The emergent energy axis between Israel, Cyprus and Greece represents a new element in the Mediterranean geopolitical landscape 70 . This could represent a potential element of destabilization in the region and also a source of new tensions with Turkey.
In fact, this cooperation scheme on natural gas fits into a wider scheme of collaboration also involving the defense sector. For Turkey, the development of defense and energy cooperation between Israel, Cyprus, and Greece is scarcely welcome. As underlined by Ögütçü (2012) beyond its different legal claims, Turkey looks suspiciously at the prospect of closer cooperation among three countries that it views, to different degrees, as antagonists. While the notion of a new alignment between Israel, Cyprus, and Greece, with tacit support from Moscow, runs ahead of the realities on the ground, it is a prospect that cuts across a number of the objectives of Turkish foreign and energy policy 73 , such as the concept of Turkey as regional natural gas hub.
Moreover, the geopolitics of the eastern Mediterranean region does not involve only the regional actors but also other actors placed along a series of imaginary concentric circles: the European Union, the Russian Federation, the United States.
69 Reuters (2012) , "Israel-Cyprus underwater power cable takes shape", March 4. 70 A second new element in the Mediterranean geopolitical landscape is represented by the emerging axis between Turkey and Qatar. The two countries are strengthening their commercial and strategic partnership, also because of complementary interests on natural gas market: the need for gas from the Turkish side and the intention to act as a natural gas hub to Europe is complementary with the need of Qatar to sell its gas through long-term contracts. Moreover, the two countries converge also in terms of geopolitical objectives, as the common support to the Muslim Brotherhood, to Hamas and to the Syrian rebels has already exemplified. 71 According to Haaretz, the 2012 exercises simulate possible conflict with forces that resemble the Turkish navy and were scheduled to begin in Greek waters near the Turkish coast, continue near Cyprus and end in the port of Haifa. 72 The Times of Israel (2012) The EU has a primary interest on the eastern Mediterranean natural gas prospects, as natural gas will continue to play an important and increasing role in the European energy mix for coming decades. The European Commission has recently stated in its Energy Roadmap 2050 that natural gas will be critical for the transformation of the energy system, foreseeing that medium-term European gas demand will stay high, especially in the power generation sector. In 2010, about 80% of EU gas imports derived from only three suppliers: Russian Federation, Norway and Algeria. This heavy dependence on such a few suppliers stimulated the European Commission to make the concept of diversification a cornerstone of its energy policy. This concept has been interpreted on its broader definition, including both diversification of suppliers and diversification of transit countries, because of the strong geopolitical issues related to gas infrastructure. For this reason a new Eastern Mediterranean Energy Corridor would be primarily important for the EU and its energy outlook.
The Russian Federation wants to establish a strong presence in the emerging East Mediterranean gas province, firstly to maintain its preeminent position as the number one supplier to Europe and secondly to counter Turkish efforts to establish itself as a key new transit country for Caspian gas. The Russian Federation already has close ties with Israel, Cyprus and Greece. As underlined by Mankoff (2012) , Moscow views the Republic of Cyprus as an important partner and continues to back it in disputes with Turkey. Cyprus is the single largest channel for foreign direct investment in Russia, totaling more than $179 billion at the end of 2010. Moscow provided a €2.5 billion loan in December 2011 to help out the troubled Cypriot banking sector, which has been badly hit through overexposure to Greece. Talks are underway for a further €5 billion Russian loan 74 . These financial ties represent a potentially significant source of Russian influence. Moscow supports Cyprus's right to prospect for and produce gas offshore despite Turkey's objections. This has put Russia at odds with Turkey, despite the wideranging rapprochement between Moscow and Ankara over the past decade. Russia 74 MEES (2012), "Political Agenda Emerges as Cyprus Kicks Off Gas Block Talks", November 16, p. 18.
The regional countries
The European Union
The Russian Federation and the United States The United States has an interest in maximizing the gains and minimizing the risks associated with the natural gas developments in the eastern Mediterranean. Key elements of the US foreign policy in the region are: to support Israel's security; to provide an incentive for political reconciliation among states in the region; to promote European energy security through supply diversification. The increasingly tense relationship between Israel and Turkey has in recent years become one of Washington's most delicate and unwelcome foreign policy challenges. It is thus possible to expect that the US will try to ensure that energy rivalry does not spark a crisis that complicates its efforts to promote an eventual reconciliation. The US has no interest in seeing the Cyprus conflict and the rift between Israel and Turkey become interlinked as this would make both even more difficult to resolve.
The Eastern Mediterranean Energy Corridor: fantasy or reality?
This paper has tried to provide a wide framework of understanding of the multidimensional issues related to the recent natural gas developments in the eastern Mediterranean region. At this point the crucial question is the following: will the Eastern Mediterranean Energy Corridor materialize or will it remain on paper? Looking at the overall situation is possible to consider that the answer to this question will depend on two key elements: the EU natural gas demand and the commitment of Israel to export part of its natural gas.
The EU natural gas demand
The EU natural gas demand has gradually increased over the last decades: it grew on average by 4,2% per year during the 1990s, and by 2% per year from 2000 to 2008 76 .
European gas demand strongly decreased in 2009 for the first time, primarily because of global financial turmoil. In 2010, the level of EU gas demand bounced back, reaching a new all-time high of 493 bcm, mainly because of a slight economic recovery and a cold winter. However, in 2011 EU gas demand declined to 448 bcm, due to the worsening of the economic crisis and a mild winter. There is a great uncertainty as to the role of natural gas in the future mid-to long term EU energy mix. With its EU Energy Roadmap 2050 the European Commission has affirmed that natural gas will be critical for the transformation of the EU energy system. However, looking at the variety of projections on future EU natural gas demand made by different institutions, it is possible to perceive a high level of uncertainty. Some projections (mainly industry based) show an increasing gas demand, while others (integrating strong climate policies) show a declining gas demand 77 .
Different demand projections for EU-27
Source: ENTSOG TYNDP 77 For a comprehensive overview on the different scenarios regarding the EU natural gas demand outlook, please refer to: Tagliapietra S., Hafner M., Glachant J.M., De Jong J., Ahner N. (2012), "A New EU Gas Security of Supply Architecture", European Energy Studies, Claeys & Casteels, Deventer. Together with the mid-to-long term EU natural gas demand also the EU natural gas import needs thus remain a major question mark. This major uncertainty could postpone investment decisions on the Eastern Mediterranean Energy Corridor up to the moment on which the EU natural gas demand outlook will appear clearer.
The commitment of Israel to export part of its natural gas
Surprisingly, a major threat to the development of the Eastern Mediterranean Energy Corridor could be represented by Israel itself. Owning the largest natural gas reserves in the offshore eastern Mediterranean, the country has a pivotal role in the emerging eastern Mediterranean natural gas architecture. In other words, a large-scale development of the Eastern Mediterranean Energy Corridor seems to be very difficult without a strong commitment of Israel to export a substantial part of its natural gas.
In October 2011 the Government of Israel appointed an inter-ministerial committee to examine government policy on the natural gas industry in Israel 78 . The committee, chaired by Mr. Shaul Tzemach, Director General of the Ministry of Energy and Water Resources, conducted a comparative study of the accepted policy in the natural gas sector around the world. The goal was to learn from accrued international experience and identify best practices, and accordingly to recommend to the Government of Israel the optimal policy for the natural gas industry in Israel. Because of the importance of the gas resources for the future of the Israeli economy and society, the committee attributed great importance to ensuring that these limited resources would be utilized in such a way as to maximize their value for the Israeli public and contribute to the country's foreign relations.
The government policy proposed by the committee gives total preference to supplying natural gas for the needs of the local economy in a way that weighs considerations of economic feasibility and constitutes social-wide optimization, particularly in view of the perception that gas resources are a public resource. For this reasons, the committee suggested that Israel could export by 2037 no more than 500 bcm of its existing and perspective gas resources. However, the Committee's recommendations are not expected to be implemented quickly, especially because of the change of government in Israel. For this reason Israel's gas sector development seems to have reached an impasse that only the government that will came out from the forthcoming elections can unlock.
For the time being, unclear government policy does not allow rights holders to take the necessary decisions and obtain the funding that is essential for developing the reservoirs, and therefore creates uncertainty all along the natural gas industry's supply chain. The price of this uncertainty could be very high not only for Israel but also for the overall concept of Eastern Mediterranean Energy Corridor.
Conclusion: technical responses to policy uncertainties
In conclusion, it seems too early to fully understand what will be the final shape of the eastern Mediterranean Energy Corridor. However, also if the Israeli gas export perspectives remain uncertain, it is possible to expect the other active players in the area to find technical responses to policy uncertainties. In particular, rather than considering a rigid and costly solution like a pipeline, they will probably turn towards more flexible and cheaper solutions such as onshore LNG or floating LNG export plants. This is the case of the Republic of Cyprus, which is expected to be the first-mover in the area through the development of an LNG export plant. Such a development could also be applied to other eastern Mediterranean countries, in case new natural gas reserves will materialize. The flexibility provided by LNG could also help these actors to overcome the uncertain outlook of the EU natural gas demand, thereby facilitating the necessary investment for the implementation of what could be defined as the first phase of the eastern Mediterranean Energy Corridor.
If a second phase, also concerning the construction of the East Med Gas Pipeline, will ever materialize is -paraphrasing Socrates-unknown to anyone but God.
